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Introduction
This paper centres on the following question: why did Russia make humanitarian arguments to explain its military actions in Crimea in 2014? At the time, Russia claimed it had intervened to protect Russian nationals and the Russian-speaking population, who were in peril.
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Russia claimed that the anti-Russian sentiment that accompanied, and was partially responsible for, the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych signalled a dangerous animosity toward 1 We would like to express our gratitude to Maria Josua and André Bank for their valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. In particular, we thank our research assistants Karlin Gray, Breann Magana-Garcia, and Pete Theodoratos. Funding for this research project was provided by the International Diffusion and Cooperation of Authoritarian Regimes (IDCAR) network at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), which is sponsored by the Leibniz Association, as well as the University of Colorado Denver. Russian citizens and Russian-speaking Ukrainians who had pledged allegiance to Russia during this internal Ukrainian struggle. The community in Crimea was particularly vulnerable.
When discussing Crimea, Putin claimed, This [intervention] is legitimate and corresponds with our interests of protecting people who are historically tied to us, who have cultural ties to us, who have economic ties
[…] This is a humanitarian mission. We wonʹt dictate anything to anyone but of course we wonʹt stand aside if people are threatened. (Borger 2014) Such rhetoric contains elements of the norm of humanitarian intervention. Under the right conditions, this norm is considered a permissible exception to the non-intervention norm, a norm that protects sovereign states from external interference in their domestic affairs (Jose 2018 ). The humanitarian intervention norm's content has fluctuated over the centuries, as has the international community's embrace of it (Jose 2018) . The latest version of humanitarian intervention embraced by many members of the international community is the Responsible to Protect (R2P) doctrine.
However, not all members of the international community have completely accepted prevailing versions of the humanitarian intervention norm as a permissible exception to the non-intervention norm. Russia is one of these states. It has repeatedly opposed the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, much to the frustration of R2P advocates (Badescu and Weiss 2010; Allison 2013) . For instance, Russia consistently used its veto power in the UN Security Council to prevent international intervention to aid Syrian civilians in dire humanitarian need. Hence the reason that Russian claims of humanitarianism in Crimea are a puzzle. After all, Russia could reasonably expect the resulting accusations of hypocrisy by the international community when it justified its Crimean actions on humanitarian grounds.
There is a second reason why Russia's humanitarian justifications in Crimea are a puzzle.
The country used similar justifications during its war with Georgia in 2008. At the time, the international community rejected those claims as disingenuous. Thus, arguably, Russia could have foreseen that a humanitarian defence was unlikely to assuage those who viewed its actions in Crimea as an impermissible violation of Ukraine's sovereignty to further its material interests. In fact, the humanitarian rhetoric may have emboldened the international community to penalise Russia, out of fear of the security and economic ramifications of its flouting of international law.
According to the autocracy literature, these rejections of Russia's normative claims as fig
leaves for a materialist agenda are not completely unfounded. This literature claims that autocratic regimes are primarily motivated by their material interests, not norm compliance. If ideational justifications are used, they are used instrumentally to further those material interests. As Kurt Weyland (2017) points out, today's autocracies lack the missionary zeal of the fascist, national-socialist, and communist regimes of the twentieth century. Instead, they are "driven primarily by self-interest in regime survival and therefore engage in pragmatic col- This paper starts from this premise. We ask whether Russia's claim that it engaged in a humanitarian intervention is more than a clever and disingenuous attempt to disguise pure power politics. Could ideational considerations motivate Russia's attempt to contest dominant understandings of legitimate humanitarian interventions and reshape associated norms? We also try to assess how the world community responded to Russia's justifications.
Who has rejected these claims and who has been more amenable to them? We should emphasise that our research questions primarily focus on why Russia made humanitarian arguments to justify its Crimean intervention. Consequently, our paper does not examine the sincerity of Russia's intentions. And while we do investigate how the intervention affected Russia's material interests, we do so in order to accept or reject our norm contestation hypothesis. The intervention's material impacts on Russia are not the primary focus of our paper. Russia's humanitarian justifications in Crimea may be evidence that it is acting as a norm entrepreneur, introducing an alternative version of humanitarian intervention as a challenge to the extant R2P doctrine. According to Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) well-known norm life cycle model, normative ideas journey through various stages once they have been ushered into the global arena by a norm entrepreneur. The early phases, in which norm entrepreneurs lobby for their normative ideas, are considered the pre-emergence and emergence phases. During these phases, norm entrepreneurs pitch their ideas to various actors already holding many other normative commitments. In this competitive normative environment, norm entrepreneurs strategically use rhetorical action to gain supporters (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) . And in challenging extant ideas about appropriate behaviour, entrepreneurs may also act inappropriately as a means of initiating the norm life cycle, incurring material and social costs to shepherd their pet cause through this process (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 ). Finnemore and Sikkink illustrate this point by describing how suffragettes were arrested for damaging property in their bid to achieve women's right to vote. In doing so, norm entrepreneurs seemingly opt to abide by the logic of appropriateness when it conflicts with the logic of consequences. If norm entrepreneurs are successful during this initial stage, the practice continues its development toward becoming a full-fledged norm. However, there is nothing inevitable about this process. Normative ideas may advance through this life cycle to emerge as norms. Yet they may also fail to emerge. Some factors vital to a normative idea's fate are whether the international environment is ready to accept this novel idea, how well the idea coheres with the extant normative structure, and the prominence of the norm entrepreneur (for a more detailed discussion, see Florini 1996) .
As may now be evident, the norm life cycle is rife with contestation. In its early stages, there may not yet be consensus on a potential norm's contents. It is quite likely that as norm entrepreneurs cajole and threaten, their audience is actively pushing back (Jose, 2018 These discussions regarding norm contestation are situated within a broader norms literature that generally possesses a "good" norm bias. The norms literature typically focuses on "good" norms, such as those that promote civil and political rights and democracy (Deibert and Crete-Nishihata 2012 ). Yet, the concept of norms does not require a particular content, but a sense of "oughtness" for whatever behaviour they regulate. Norms are after all just "a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) . Thus, ideas that reflect illiberal values, like the version of humanitarian intervention advanced by Russia (see below), can be considered "norm-worthy." Indeed, looking empirically into the global arena, we are able to observe and scrutinise the full panoply of norms.
Moreover, another bias manifests in the heightened attention given to how non-state actors introduce and promote new normative ideas (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Carpenter 2007 ). Yet, there is no reason why states cannot also be norm entrepreneurs (Reinold 2013; Fisher 2007; Jose 2017 Consequently, Russia could be a norm entrepreneur for its version of humanitarian intervention, with justifications for its Ukrainian intervention serving as evidence. In other words, it may be advocating for a different set of parameters for humanitarian exceptions to the nonintervention norm which differ from those advocated by the United States, a norm entrepreneur for the more widely accepted R2P doctrine.
Lastly, much of the extant norms literature tends to have a directional bias: norms originate in the West and from there, diffuse to the rest of the international community. By examining Russia as a potential normative source, this paper offers a more inclusive perspective to the study of norms (Acharya 2014) .
Probing Russian Norm Entrepreneurship
The literature on autocracies appears to parallel the IR literature's blind eye to autocracies as normative actors. Recent studies indeed suggest that in promoting autocratic rule abroad, (March and Olsen 1984) .
Russia is widely regarded as one of those autocratic states that generally pursues pure power politics. Since Vladimir Putin's rise to the Russian presidency in 2000, Russia's regime has augmented power, which it has used to stifle political opposition at home and regain a dominant position abroad (Gelman 2015) . To be more precise, Russia is attempting to stake out its exclusive sphere of influence, which largely coincides with its former colonies, the Soviet successor states, and regain its great power status, which it lost in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ball 2017; Kuzio 2017 Kneuer (2013) argues that autocratic regimes' foreign policies can strengthen national identity and loyalty to the political leadership by reifying the notion of the self and the other through "identity" and "delimitation" discourses. These discourses are especially successful if foreign policies align with the ideas and identities of the collective (Kneuer 2013: 212) . Kneuer thereby appears to argue that both an internal and an external dimension of the logic of appropriateness shapes an autocratic regime's foreign policies.
In the wake of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, "perhaps [Russia's] greatest foreign policy defeat since the end of the Cold War" (Ambrosio 2007: 245) , Russia has started to counter the Western normative hegemony, strengthen its soft power, and offer an "ideological alternative to Western values and norms" (Popescu 2006) . This ideological alternative is centred on established international norms such as sovereignty and non-intervention, ideas of a "just" world order such as multipolarity embedded in the multilateral structure of the United Nations, and Russia's specific brand of "managed" democracy. Behind these norms and ideas stands Russia's conviction that its regime should be considered as legitimate as any Western regime, that the West should abstain from interfering in the domestic affairs of non-Western states, and that Russia has an exclusive responsibility for developments in the post-Soviet space, its "Near Abroad."
In particular, Russia insists that it has special responsibility for ethnic Russians in its 
Russia's focus on its responsibility to protect ethnic Russians in neighbouring countries
seems to indicate that Russia might not contest the Western parameters of humanitarian intervention on a global scale. Instead, it might simply reject the application of these parameters to its "Near Abroad," replacing R2P with its own version of humanitarian intervention.
If this version became a firmly rooted norm, the governments of neighbouring countries would feel obligated to protect the interests of ethnic Russians residing in their territories.
Kazakhstan's careful consideration of the interests of the large community of ethnic Russians in the country's northern regions serves as an example (Schatz 2000) .
Contesting R2P's jurisdiction in the "Near Abroad" also enables Russia to more broadly challenge Western ideational hegemony on a global scale. To some degree, we have already seen this campaign in action, with autocratic regimes, including Russia, challenging Western notions of democratic rule and human rights (Bell 2000) . Although it is unlikely that autocratic norms would gain much traction in the West, this scenario could still pose a threat to Western governments. It would indirectly promote autocratic rule through the weakening of Western norms and values, not just in Russia's "Near Abroad," but globally as well. Either way, Russia's defence of ethnic Russians living abroad and its challenging of Western hegemony seem to indicate that the Russian leadership is engaging in the discourses of "identity"
and "delimitation" that Kneuer (2013) considers part and parcel of autocratic regimes' legitimation practices.
Yet in assessing Russia's normative agenda, Richard Sakwa (2011) argues that Russia is neither a "norm-taker" nor a "norm-maker." It is merely attempting to find a balance between its national identity and existing international norms, ensuring "that all parties are equally subjected to [these norms] while excluding the instrumental use of [them]" (Sakwa 2011: 966) . Against this background, the ideational justification of Russia's intervention in that Russia has acted in an unprincipled manner, merely advancing its economic and security interests without a genuine regard for international norms. This might, however, be an incomplete conclusion. It might well be that Russia is not a norm-taker. Instead, it may be that Russia is a norm-maker because it is both contesting dominant understandings of humanitarian intervention and lobbying for an alternative version of it.
Tracing Communicative Trails
The previous section raised the possibility that Russia is an unconventional principled actor and that its justifications for its incursion into Crimea indeed reflect a normative, albeit illiberal, In examining these articles, we focused on longer direct and indirect quotes from top government officials of these 20+ countries and top officials from major international organisations involved in the conflict, such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (see Appendix I for full list of countries and organisations covered). The articles were then uploaded to a QDA software (Atlas.ti). Two graduate research assistants coded these articles, largely independent of each other.
In this section of the paper, we present the results of the QDA. The research assistants were asked to code Russia's justifications for its incursion into and annexation of Crimea (material and non-material/normative); responses to these justifications by officials from the countries and organisations named above (rejection and acceptance); Russian denial of its official military involvement in Crimea; Russian acknowledgement of material, reputational and other costs incurred on Russia due to international sanctions; Russian accusations of Western hypocrisy in response to Western critiques of Russia's actions in Crimea; Western incentives to induce a change in Russia's course in Crimea; and "interesting quotes" from officials that deserve further analysis. After several rounds of coding and discussions between the principal investigators and the research assistants to clarify ambiguities and confusion, the intercoder reliability scores have reached satisfying levels for most codes, from as high as 1.0 to around 0.6. However, the scores for a few codes were lower, ranging between 0.35 and 0.5.
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If Russia used humanitarian justifications merely to fend off penalties for materially motivated violations of the non-intervention norm, we would expect it to abandon them if they no longer served their purpose. That is, we would expect Russia to shift to other justifications after the issuance of threats or the imposition of sanctions or other costs to its material interests.
However, if Russia tried to advance a normative agenda, we would expect to observe a few discursive patterns. First, Russia would consistently make ideational justifications for its incursion into Crimea. Of course, we are particularly interested in justifications that resemble R2P language, but we have also considered other normative justifications. Second, we would observe Russia's repeated use of this rhetoric. Merely offering ideational justifications alone would not necessarily indicate norm contestation and norm entrepreneurship. The strongest evidence of Russia's normative actor status would be its willingness to continue its normative agenda even if penalties for its contestation and entrepreneurship efforts were imposed.
Such fidelity would demonstrate a heightened level of commitment consistent with the literature's depiction of norm entrepreneurs.
We now present the results of the QDA. In doing so, we distinguish between two longer The two figures support the hypothesis that Russia is committed to its normative agenda.
First, normative justifications far outweighed material justifications at every stage of the conflict. Second, this was the case even though the international community mainly rejected these justifications and imposed sanctions, the costs of which Russian officials publicly acknowledged. This is quite interesting considering the literature's emphasis on material interests as an impetus for Russian actions in the global arena. It appears that, given the extent to which these justifications are offered, the humanitarian case was an important one for Russia to make. It also appears that the material costs did not dissuade Russia from promoting its norm. These patterns indicate that Russia was quite dedicated to challenging the extant R2P doctrine and advancing its own version of humanitarian intervention. The frequency with which Russia acknowledged the material costs suggests as much. Russia may have been trying to enhance its credibility as a norm entrepreneur by demonstrating the lengths it will go to champion its norm. This pattern conforms to Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998: 897) description of norm entrepreneurs:
Deliberately inappropriate acts [such as violating non-intervention and R2P norms], especially those entailing social ostracism or legal punishment, can be powerful tools for norm entrepreneurs seeking to send a message and frame an issue.
Of course, Russia's leadership also gained from the annexation of Crimea. In the wake of the annexation Putin experienced a large bump in his domestic approval ratings, as did the Russian government; meanwhile, Russians' attitudes towards Europe and the United States plunged. However, the Russian government's ratings have since dipped considerably, and
Putin's at least slightly. Attitudes towards Russia's main adversaries have also significantly improved (Levada-Center 2017). It was quite predictable that political gains at the domestic level would only be temporary. Economically, the annexation has been very costly -and that is not even considering Western sanctions (Berman 2015) . It is unlikely that these costs And what exactly is the norm Russia has promoted? While we have not been able to sift through the hundreds of quotes yet, a cursory look at Russia's justifications reveals the skeletal framework of this norm. First, it could actually coexist with the non-intervention norm.
This may seem surprising given the widespread allegation in the international community that Russia violated Ukraine's sovereignty (see below). In a nutshell, Russian authorities accused the opposition of having staged a coup against the legitimate government of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, who then had every right to ask for foreign help against this unconstitutional attempt to oust him from power. Thus, Russia was able to counter accusa- Another difference is that Russia's norm enables unilateral action, whereas R2P requires UN Security Council approval for the humanitarian intervention to be legal under international law. It is interesting that Russia not only justified its incursion into Crimea with its responsibility to protect the Russian minority in Ukraine, but that it also denounced Western critiques of Russia's action in Ukraine as hypocritical. In doing so, it claimed Western countries had repeatedly engaged in humanitarian interventions without the approval of the international community (e.g. in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999). Russia thereby attempted to dismantle the normative legitimacy of the West on this issue while at the same time propping up its own normative agenda, which focuses on the protection of its own citizens. It is less clear, however, why Russia denied official military involvement until the very moment the annexation of Crimea was a fait accompli. It might have attempted to lay the normative foundation for its intervention before the international community started to focus on the actual developments on the ground. Yet, what is more significant is that Russia continued to make normative arguments once it had begun to make them, thereby abandoning its denials, which had accounted for a much smaller proportion of its entire rhetorical repertoire. n/a n/a 3 n/a Belarus 6 n/a 5 3 Canada 13 2 n/a n/a China 2 n/a 3 n/a EU 32 6 3 n/a France 9 n/a 6 3 Georgia 9 n/a n/a n/a Germany 60 6 6 n/a Japan 8 2 n/a n/a Kazakhstan n/a n/a 6 n/a NATO 48 26 n/a n/a OSCE 2 n/a n/a n/a Other Countries 25 10 9 n/a Other Organisations 51 11 2 2 Poland n/a n/a 3 n/a Turkey 18 2 2 n/a Ukraine 62 13 3 n/a United Kingdom 60 6 n/a n/a United Nations 9 n/a 3 n/a USA 291 52 35 5
Consequently, at least at the beginning of the conflict, Western countries were somewhat divided over Russia's normative and even material justifications. While Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and all international organisations roundly criticised Russia for violating international law, Germany, France, and even Poland were more receptive to Russia's normative justifications. Unsurprisingly, Kazakhstan, with a large Russian minority, China, and some other countries (including Russia's ally in the Middle East, Syria) accepted the legitimacy of Russia's normative justifications. This acceptance might have emboldened Russian norm entrepreneurship, even in the face of Western sanctions. Yet given how normatively and materially powerful Russia's primary opponents are, the emergence of its norm is not certain. It may well fail to emerge as such.
Conclusion
Based on a preliminary QDA of the communicative trail surrounding Russia's incursion into Crimea, this paper suggests that Russia has pursued inter alia a normative agenda in its foreign policy. Furthermore, our research indicates that Russia is willing to incur material costs to pursue this agenda. This is not say that norms cannot ever further material interests. In Whether Russia's version of humanitarian intervention will pass beyond the initial stages of the norm life cycle is an open question at the moment. As already mentioned, there are indications that it may fail to emerge. However, the US missile strikes in Syria in 2017 could ironically help it graduate to the next stage in the cycle. The United States claims that its unilateral military intervention was legitimate because it was motivated by humanitarian concerns that were accepted by a diverse group of governments, even though many legal experts considered it a violation of the non-intervention norm and the R2P doctrine. Such a significant reaction may indicate shifting global state attitudes about the non-intervention norm, in ways unexpectedly favourable to Russia's ideational agenda.
These findings and implications should encourage international relations scholars to theorise norms in new ways. Norms can encapsulate a wide range of content and can be promoted by a broad array of actors. Such insights, and the exciting possibilities for future research they inspire, are possible if there are concerted efforts to build bridges between disciplines. Rather than operating within segregated silos, interdisciplinary collaborations can reap important benefits for the scholarly enterprise.
These findings also ask scholars studying autocratic regimes to widen the scope of their studies when they look at autocratic diffusion and cooperation. Autocratic regimes might not just want to spread non-democratic rule beyond their (immediate) borders, be it for selfinterested or ideological reasons (Weyland 2017 we think about what constitutes appropriate behaviour in international relations. And while we know that autocratic regimes have not been particularly successful in spreading nondemocratic rule beyond their borders, despite strong regional patterns of authoritarian diffusion and cooperation (Bank 2017 (Bank :1351 Brownlee 2017) , they might be quite successful in contesting international norms.
